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INTRODUCTION 
The testimony of Aris Vision Institute, Inc.'s ("Aris") own employees at trial 
proved conclusively that Aris vacated the Premises on January 4, 2002, terminated all 
business operations in Utah as well as throughout the country on that date, wrongfully 
turned possession over to the doctors on January 7 and failed to pay the January rent. The 
judgment entered in error by the trial court not only absolved Aris from any liability for 
abandoning the Premises and turning possession over to the doctors in breach of the 
Lease, but imposed hundreds of thousands of dollars in trebled damages against Wasatch 
Property Management, Inc. ("Wasatch") and JDJ Properties, Inc. ("JDJ") for not turning 
possession of the equipment and furniture (the "Equipment") over to Aris sooner. The 
trial court reached this incredible result even though Aris was voluntarily cooperating 
with Wasatch and JDJ to relet the Premises and sell the Equipment for a number of 
months in order to mitigate Aris's liability for damages. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment is erroneous as a matter of law and 
should be reversed. JDJ is entitled to recover on its Counterclaim for lost rents. Wasatch 
and JDJ are not liable for treble damages for forcible detainer or for wrongful eviction or 
even for conversion of the Equipment. Finally, the amount of damages awarded by the 
trial court is clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
A. WASATCH AND JDJ HAVE FULLY COMPLIED WITH THEIR 
OBLIGATION TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Aris attempts to short circuit the arguments asserted by Wasatch and JDJ by 
erroneously contending - - and repeating throughout its brief- - that Wasatch and JDJ 
have failed to comply with their obligation to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's decision. [Appellee's Brief at 14-15] 
This argument is surprising given the fact that Wasatch and JDJ have devoted a 
large portion of their brief to marshaling the evidence presented by Aris in the trial court 
and the facts to which the parties stipulated below and have based their arguments on that 
marshaled evidence. [See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at 6-23] 
In this regard, there is a glaring omission from Aris's brief. Aris does not point out 
to the court any evidence that Wasatch and JDJ supposedly failed to marshal that supports 
the trial court's decision. This omission is understandable given the fact that all of the 
evidence recited by Aris in its Statement of Facts is included in the Statement of Facts 
contained in Appellant's Brief. Indeed, in their brief, Wasatch and JDJ have recited the 
evidence relied upon by Aris in more detail than Aris itself presents the evidence in its 
brief. Importantly, the arguments made by Wasatch and JDJ are based entirely on Aris's 
evidence, the stipulated facts and the trial court's findings with the limited exception of 
JDJ's undisputed testimony concerning the re-letting of the Premises and lost rents. That 
is no doubt why Aris has not challenged a single piece of evidence cited in Appellants' 
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Brief or asserted in Aris's Statement of Facts a single fact not contained in Appellants' 
Brief 
Aris's marshaling argument is devoid of merit, and should be rejected. 
B. ARIS ABANDONED THE PREMISES WITHOUT PAYING RENT AND 
WRONGFULLY TURNED OVER POSSESSION TO THE DOCTORS. 
Wasatch and JDJ demonstrated in Appellants' Brief that without any notice Aris 
abruptly terminated all of its business on the premises leased from JDJ (the "Premises") 
on January 4, 2002, turned over possession of the Premises to the independent contractor 
doctors on January 7 and failed to pay rent within 15 days of the due date. Aris does not 
and cannot dispute these facts, which were established by the testimony of its own 
employees. Thus, under Utah Code Ann., §78-36-12.3, Aris is presumed to have 
abandoned the Premises in breach of paragraph 18.1(d) of the Lease [Pi's Ex. 9], and is 
liable for damages. The arguments raised by Aris in its brief are insufficient to defeat this 
claim. 
1. Abandonment Was Raised Below. 
Aris attempts to sidestep the abandonment argument by incorrectly asserting that 
Wasatch and JDJ failed below to raise the argument that Aris abandoned the Premises on 
January 4, 2002. [Appellee's Brief at 17] This argument is belied by the record. In the 
court below, Wasatch and JDJ repeatedly argued that Aris either abandoned the Premises 
on January 4 or at least by February 9 when the doctors vacated. For example: 
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(a) In the Pretrial Order, Wasatch and JDJ contended that Aris unilaterally 
terminated the Lease on January 4 and that Aris had abandoned the Premises more than 
five days prior to January 22, 2002, which was the date on which Aris contended the 
forcible detainer occurred. [R. 169-170 & 176] 
(b) In their Trial Brief, Wasatch and JDJ argued that Aris shut down its office and 
terminated all of its employees on or about January 4, 2002, allowed the doctors to take 
possession of the Premises and then negotiated with the doctors to attempt to transfer the 
Lease and Equipment to the doctors and that Aris failed to pay the January rent. [R. 219] 
Wasatch and JDJ argued that Aris's own testimony demonstrated that the doctors - - not 
Aris - - were in possession of the Premises on January 22, 2002 and that since Aris had 
terminated all its employees on January 4, 2002, Aris was not in possession after that 
date. Wasatch and JDJ concluded that "if the tenant has abandoned or surrendered 
possession of the premises there can be no claim of forcible detainer." [R. 230-231] 
(c) In closing argument before Judge Lewis, Wasatch and JDJ again argued that 
Aris abandoned the Premises on January 4 when it terminated its employees and closed its 
offices. [R. 529 at 558-559 & 577; R. 305] 
Moreover, the testimony of Aris's own witnesses at trial establishes that Wasatch 
and JDJ have always claimed Aris abandoned the Premises prior to January 22, 2002, 
when Aris's Richard Enright ("Enright") came to Salt Lake to attempt to remove the 
Equipment. Enright testified that Wasatch's property manager, Dennis Peacock 
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("Peacock"), refused to accept a check for rent on January 22, stating that it was too late 
because Aris had abandoned the Premises, that Wasatch was not taking Aris's money and 
that Wasatch had seized the Equipment. [R. 526 at 44-45; R. 415, Finding No. 27] 
Likewise, Aris's Kathleen Soto ("Soto") testified that on that same day Peacock told her 
Aris had abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease and that as a result 
Wasatch was entitled to seize Aris's personal property. [R. 413, Finding Nos. 28 & 29] 
Clearly, Wasatch and JDJ repeatedly raised the January 4 abandonment argument 
below, and did not waive that argument. 
2. Aris Breached the Lease by Giving Possession to the Doctors. 
Aris also mistakenly contends that Wasatch and JDJ waived the argument that Aris 
breached the Lease by "subletting" the Premises to the doctors. [Appellee's Brief at 18] 
Initially, Wasatch and JDJ do not contend that the Premises were "sublet," but instead 
argue that possession of the Premises was wrongfully turned over to the doctors while 
Aris unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a sublease or assignment with the doctors. As 
demonstrated above, Wasatch and JDJ argued that Aris abandoned the Premises on 
January 4 and turned over possession to the doctors and Aris's own witnesses testified to 
these facts. [R. 527 at 235-237; R. 296-297]1 
1
 In any event, even if it were assumed that this argument was not raised in the trial court, 
whether Aris's admitted conduct in turning over possession of the Premises to the doctors 
constituted a breach of the Lease is purely a question of law that could be raised for the first time 
on appeal. See cased cited at p. 15, infra. 
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Aris next argues that there was no breach of the Lease because the trial court found 
that Aris never entered into a sublease or assignment of the Lease with the doctors, but 
was only negotiating an assignment. [Appellee's Brief at 18-19] This argument too 
narrowly construes the Lease. Paragraph 11.1 of the Lease prohibited Aris from 
assigning or subletting or allowing any other person to use or occupy the Premises 
without JDJys prior written consent.2 [Pi's Ex. 9] 
Aris also argues that JDJ "acquiesced" in the doctors remaining in the Premises by 
proposing to work out a business solution after January 22. [Appellee's Brief at 19] The 
fact that Wasatch and JDJ allowed the doctors to remain in possession of the Premises 
after Aris had already breached the Lease by abandoning the Premises and turning 
possession over to the doctors weeks earlier, and while the parties were attempting to 
negotiate an agreement for the doctors to assume the Lease, did not somehow waive 
Aris's breach of the Lease and the trial court did not so find. In fact, Section 11.4 of the 
Lease provided that in the event Aris allowed a third party to occupy the Premises, JDJ 
could even collect rent from the third party without waiving the necessity for Aris to 
obtain JDJ's consent to the assignment, subletting or transfer of possession. [Pi's Ex. 9] 
2
 Aris tells the court that unknown to Aris, as of January 1, 2002, the doctors had entered 
into a Lease Agreement with JDJ for new space so they were not even potential subtenants with 
respect to the Premises. [Appellee's Brief at 19] This argument is incorrect. The Lease with the 
doctors was entered into some time after January 22, but provided it was effective as of January 
1. [R. 527 at 307-308] In fact, it was undisputed that Aris and the doctors continued negotiating 
for Aris to take over the Lease into February. [R. 527 at 219-220] In this regard, Aris's Soto 
testified that Skalka told her prior to January 22 that the doctors were looking at new space. [R. 
527 at 239] 
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3. The Evidence Establishes Abandonment as a Matter of Law. 
Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the evidence supporting 
the trial court's finding that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to January 22, and 
therefore it must be taken as established that Aris did not vacate. Once more, Aris is 
content to state this mere conclusion without telling the Court what supposed evidence 
was not marshaled. As discussed earlier, Wasatch and JDJ have indeed marshaled the 
evidence. Further, Aris's argument ignores the uncontroverted testimony of its own 
witnesses that Aris ceased all operations and terminated all its employees on January 4 
and turned over possession to the doctors on January 7 without paying the January rent. 
Aris also contends that the ruling on abandonment should be upheld because 
Wasatch and JDJ have failed to challenge the trial court's finding that Aris never intended 
to surrender the Premises. Aris argues that absent an intent to surrender there can be no 
abandonment. [Appellee's Brief at 21] This argument fails because surrender and 
abandonment are two different legal principles. See Thomas & Backman on Utah Real 
Property Law, §5.03(e) at 197 (1999). Most importantly, Aris's intent to surrender (or 
abandon) is irrelevant to presumed abandonment under Utah Code Ann., §78-36-12.3, 
which only requires the tenant's failure to notify the owner that the tenant will be absent 
from the premises, failure to pay rent within 15 days and lack of reasonable evidence 
other than the presence of the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the 
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premises. Aris introduced no such evidence. Aris could not do so because the doctors 
were occupying the Premises and conducting their own business.3 
All of the evidence upon which Wasatch's andJDJ's abandonment argument is 
based comes from the testimony of Aris's own witnesses. Aris does not challenge any of 
that evidence - - or point to any contrary or additional evidence - - but only argues about 
the legal conclusion of abandonment. Aris's position is without merit because the law is 
clear that Aris's act in vacating the Premises on January 4, turning over possession of the 
Premises to the doctors by January 7 and failing to pay the January rent constituted an 
abandonment and a breach of the Lease. JDJ was, therefore, entitled to recover damages 
on its Counterclaim together with attorneys fees and costs incurred below and on appeal. 
C. ARIS IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER FOR FORCIBLE DETAINER 
OR WRONGFUL EVICTION AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Aris raises a number of arguments to attempt to convince the court that Judge 
Lewis properly entered judgment for treble damages on the forcible detainer claim and a 
judgment for wrongful eviction. As will now be demonstrated, these arguments are not 
supported by the evidence or the applicable law. 
3
 Aris also argues that presumed abandonment under §78-36-12.3 does not apply because 
Judge Lewis found that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to January 22. [Appellee's Brief at 
22] However, as demonstrated above, the undisputed evidence establishes that Aris vacated and 
abandoned the Premises on January 4. 
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1. Forcible Detainer. 
After Aris ceased all business operations, terminated all employees and vacated the 
Premises on January 4 and voluntarily turned over possession of the Premises to the 
doctors on January 7, Aris had no reason or desire to occupy the Premises and had no 
ability to do so. Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do 
so by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible detainer 
statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the withholding of personal 
property.4 Utah Code Ann., §78-36-2. See Freeway ParkBldg., Inc. v. Western States 
Wholesale Supply, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1969). 
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and 
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965), for the proposition that a landlord can 
be held liable under the forcible detainer statute for seizing a tenant's personal property 
without judicial process. [Appellee's Brief at 31] These cases are not on point because 
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord also refused to 
permit the tenant to remove personal property. Further, the Supreme Court only 
recognized that the tenants had causes of action for conversion of the personal property. 
The Supreme Court did not hold or intimate in either case that treble damages can be 
awarded against a landlord for conversion of the tenant's personal property. 
4
 Aris does not appear to challenge that Wasatch and JDJ raised below the argument that 
the forcible detainer statute only applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not personal 
property. In any event, they clearly did raise this argument. [See, e.g., R. 401-402 ^[a, c & e; 
175-176; 230-231; 305-306; R. 529 at 560-561; 403 |5] 
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a. Aris Did Not Meet the Five Day Possession Requirement. 
Aris contends that it satisfied the requirement that it be in possession of the 
Premises for five days prior to the alleged forcible detainer because the trial court found 
that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to January 22. [Appellee's Brief at 25] Aris is 
forced to again ignore the undisputed testimony of its own witnesses discussed above 
which demonstrates that this finding is clearly erroneous because Aris vacated on January 
4 and turned over possession to the doctors on January 7. 
Aris also argues that the five day requirement is not applicable because Aris says it 
relies on subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann., §78-36-2, and the five day requirement is 
contained in subsection (2). [Appellee's Brief at 25] Subsection (1) is inapplicable, 
however, because Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep possession of the 
Premises or do so by force, as will be demonstrated below. Moreover, even under 
subsection (1) possession by the tenant at the time of the forcible detainer is required. 
Aris did not meet that requirement because it was not in possession of the Premises on 
January 22 or thereafter. 
b. The Doctors Were in Possession of the Premises as of January 22, So There 
Could Have Been No Forcible Detainer on That Date. 
Aris erroneously takes the position that the fact that the doctors were in possession 
of the Premises on January 22 is irrelevant to the forcible detainer claim because: (1) 
Wasatch and JDJ did not argue below that Aris had sublet the Premises to the doctors; (2) 
Skalka supposedly only refused to release the Equipment based on Peacock's directive 
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and; (3) because from February 9 onward the Premises were solely within the control of 
Wasatch and JDJ. 
Again, Wasatch and JDJ do not argue that Aris had "sublet" the Premises to the 
doctors, but instead argue that Aris had wrongfully given possession of the Premises to 
the doctors. As demonstrated earlier (pp. 4-6), this argument was in fact raised below. 
Wasatch and JDJ also raised the argument that Aris was not entitled to use self-help 
against the doctors on January 22 to recover the Equipment. [See, e.g., R. 220-221, f 10; 
R. 222, Tfl6; R. 230; R. 289, 202; R. 305] Further, there was no testimony that Skalka 
would have turned over the Equipment the doctors were using for their surgeries that had 
been scheduled for January 22 and for weeks thereafter if Peacock would have agreed. 
Because the doctors - - not Aris - - were in possession of the Premises on January 
22 and Aris did not even seek possession of the Premises, there could have been no 
forcible detainer on that date. Indeed, Enright was given access to the Premises by Skalka 
on January 22. All Wasatch's Peacock did was to refuse to agree that Enright could 
remove the Equipment. Wasatch and JDJ did not wrongfully withhold the Equipment that 
was in the possession of the doctors on that date, but even if it is assumed they did so, that 
would not have constituted a forcible detainer of real property. 
c. Wasatch and JDJ Did Not Hold the Property by Force. 
Aris contends that Wasatch held the Premises "by force" by two acts. First, 
Peacock told Enright on January 22 that he could not take the Equipment. Second, 
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Peacock later changed the locks sometime after the doctors vacated on February 9 and 
then again in June based on the Salt Lake County seizure notice and because of the 
purported "ongoing refusal to give Aris free and unfettered access to the Premises . . . ." 
[Appellee's Brief at 26] The record simply does not support any conclusion that Wasatch 
and JDJ held the Premises by force. 
There was absolutely no evidence that when Enright attempted to remove the 
Equipment on January 22 Peacock took any physical action to prevent Enright from doing 
so. Peacock simply told Enright that because Aris had abandoned the Premises, Wasatch 
had seized the Equipment. Peacock did not threaten to harm Enright. [R. 526 at 103] 
Enright himself testified that he did not have a confrontation with Peacock on January 22, 
but "basically a discussion". [R. 526 at 76-77] 
Likewise, Peacock's changing of the locks occurred sometime after February 9, 
more than five weeks after Aris had vacated and abandoned the Premises. Aris does not 
dispute that the changing of the locks had no effect whatsoever on its ability to access the 
Premises because Aris did not have keys to the Premises before the locks were changed. 
The only effect that changing the locks had was to prevent the doctors and the fired 
employees from entering the Premises after they vacated on February 9. Aris also does 
not deny that it never attempted to occupy the Premises, never requested occupancy of the 
Premises after the locks were changed and that it never even requested keys. cf. Frisco 
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Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1977) (In rejecting claim for forcible entry, 
Court noted that tenants knew locks had been changed, but did not request new keys). 
Finally, Aris does not dispute that after January 22 it only requested (and was 
given) access for the purpose of inspecting the Equipment and showing the Premises and 
Equipment to prospective purchasers. Indeed, on June 4, Olson wrote Dahlstrom 
confirming their "several" telephone conversations that the parties were working together 
to find a new tenant and that "[i]n the meantime, Aris will leave its valuable equipment in 
the space." [R. 526 at 173 & Pi's Ex. 24] 
d. JDJ Had the Contractual Right to Retain Possession of the Equipment. 
Aris does not deny that paragraph 20.1 of the Lease gave JDJ the right to retain the 
Equipment in the event of abandonment of the Premises, or challenge the authorities cited 
in Appellants' Brief holding that the provision is enforceable.5 Instead, Aris first claims 
that this argument was not preserved below. However, Aris's own witnesses, Enright and 
Soto, specifically testified that when Aris wanted to remove the Equipment on January 
22, Wasatch's Peacock told them that based on Aris's abandonment of the Premises 
5
 Aris cites Pentecost v. Harward, supra, apparently for the proposition that contractual 
provisions purporting to authorize self-help are void as against public policy. [Appellee's Brief at 
27] Pentecost is easily distinguished. In that case, the apartment manager forcibly evicted the 
tenant and her children from the premises and refused to allow them to take their furniture. The 
manager did so "without contractual or judicial sanction". In the case at bar, Aris had already 
abandoned the Premises weeks earlier and had left the Equipment on the Premises. Thus, 
Wasatch and JDJ did not resort to "self-help", but simply exercised JDJ's contractual right under 
paragraph 20.1 of the Lease, as well as its statutory lessor's lien rights under Utah Code Ann., 
§38-3-1, to retain possession of the Equipment. 
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Wasatch had seized the Equipment under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease. [R. 526 at 42-43; 
R. 527 at 247] Soto responded by claiming to Peacock that under paragraph 20.1 Aris had 
the right to remove its Equipment before surrendering the Premises. [R. 527 at 247] Olson 
also testified that Dahlstrom told him Aris could not expect Wasatch to just let all the 
security (the Equipment) walk out the door, leaving Wasatch holding the bag. [R. 526 at 
160-161]6 
Aris next asserts that it had not abandoned the Premises so paragraph 20.1 did not 
apply. The undisputed evidence, however, demonstrates that Aris had indeed abandoned 
the Premises on January 4 when it fired all of its Utah employees, terminated its 
operations and then turned over the Premises to the doctors. 
e. JDJ's Lessor's Lien Remained Effective for 30 Days After Abandonment. 
Aris argues that the court should not consider the lessor's lien argument asserted 
by JDJ and Wasatch because they admit it was not raised below. However, the 
undisputed testimony of Aris5s own witnesses was that Wasatch and JDJ told Aris on 
January 22 that Aris could not take the Equipment because it had been seized based on 
Aris's abandonment of the Premises and non-payment of rent and that JDJ's general 
counsel claimed to Aris's counsel that the Equipment was security for the unpaid rents. 
[R. 526 at 44-45 & 160-161; R. 413, Finding Nos. 28 & 29] Thus, the existence and 
6
 Moreover, even if it were wrongly assumed this issue was not raised below, the 
enforceability of this contractual provision based on undisputed facts raises a pure question of 
law that could be raised for the first time on appeal. See cases cited at p. 15, infra. 
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scope of a lessor's lien giving JDJ a statutory basis for its position the Equipment was 
security for rents under the Lease is purely a question of law. See Chase Manhattan Bank 
v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9 1J6, 89 P.3d 109, 110 (Utah 2004). See also 
Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So.2d 1024, 1028 (Miss. 1991) (scope of 
landlord's lien presents a question of law). This issue can, therefore, be raised for the 
first time on appeal. See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). 
Aris next contends that the lessor's lien should be rejected because the lien is only 
for rent due and Aris tendered past due rent on January 22. Aris does not dispute, 
however, that it failed to pay the rent when due on January 1, 2002. The lien attached at 
that time before Aris tendered a portion of the rent due on January 22. The rent tendered 
by Enright on January 22 admittedly did not include the required interest and late payment 
fee.7 [R. 527 at 262] 
Most importantly, by January 22, Aris had abandoned the Premises and turned 
over possession to the doctors in breach of the Lease. Aris was therefore liable for the 
difference between the rent accruing during the time necessary for JDJ to relet the 
Premises and for the difference between the fair rental value and the rent agreed to by 
7
 Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ did not raise at trial the fact that the check tendered 
by Enright for the January rent did not include any amount for a late payment fee or interest. 
[Appellee's Brief at 17-18] However, Wasatch and JDJ argued repeatedly that no valid tender 
was made. [See, e.g., R. 221 Tfl5; 223 f20 & 299] Counsel for Wasatch and JDJ also specifically 
elicited testimony from Soto that the check tendered for the January rent did not include the 
required late payment fee. [R. 527 at 262] It is purely a matter of law that a valid tender must 
include the entire amount due. See Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1997). It 
was Aris's burden to prove a valid tender. 
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Aris during the remaining 4-1/2 years of the Lease plus a reasonable commission for 
renting the Premises. Utah Code Ann., §78-36-12.6(1). The fair rental at the time was far 
less than the rent Aris had agreed to pay. [R. 528 at 387-390; Pi's Ex. 64 at 6-12] 
Although Wasatch and JDJ have been unable to find any case law on point, it is 
respectfully submitted that the court should reject the notion that a tenant having a long-
term lease who abandons the premises years before expiration of the lease can avoid a 
lessor's lien for rent due for the remainder of the lease by tendering rent for one month 
and then removing the tenant's property from the premises. Such a rule would 
emasculate the lessor's lien statute. 
The court should also reject Aris's argument that JDJ was required to perfect its 
lessor's lien by filing suit and obtaining a writ of attachment and that JDJ failed to do so. 
Under §38-3-1, JDJ had a lessor's lien during the time Aris occupied the Premises and for 
30 days thereafter without the necessity to file suit and obtain a writ of attachment. 
Citizens Bank v. Elks Building NV} 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983); Eason v. Wheelock, 120 
P.2d 319, 320 (Utah 1941). Therefore, JDJ had a lessor's lien on the Equipment that did 
not expire until at least February 4, 2002, and was in existence as of January 22, when 
Aris wanted to remove its Equipment. 
f. Aris Had No Right to Recover for Forcible Detainer Because it Was Not 
Seeking Restitution of the Premises. 
Wasatch and JDJ argued in their brief that the forcible detainer statute is also 
inapplicable to Aris's claims because Aris understandably did not seek restitution of real 
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property in this case. Aris responds by arguing that the restitution argument was an 
affirmative defense that was waived because it was not raised in a timely fashion. The 
cases cited by Aris did not involve the issue of whether restitution is an affirmative 
defense, and do not support that position. Aris was required to prove compliance with the 
forcible detainer statute and that the statute is applicable to the facts of this action as part 
of its case. Because Aris did not seek restitution of real property or damages for being 
deprived of occupancy of real property, Aris failed to meet its burden of proof. 
Aris argues in this regard that it was entitled to elect to recover damages for the 
alleged forcible detainer rather the remedy of restitution. This argument does not assist 
Aris because it did not seek damages for any forcible detainer of real property. Aris could 
not have proven any such damages because it vacated and abandoned the Premises on 
January 4, had no use for the Premises and did not want to occupy the Premises. Instead, 
Aris sought and recovered damages for the alleged wrongful withholding (conversion) of 
its Equipment. Treble damages under the forcible detainer statute are not recoverable for 
the alleged conversion of personal property. 
g. The Lock Changes Are Irrelevant 
Aris argues that when Wasatch changed the locks after the doctors vacated on 
February 9, 2002 (five weeks after Aris vacated), and again in June 2002 as instructed by 
Aris's familiar argument that Wasatch and JDJ did not raise the restitution argument 
below is simply wrong. The argument was raised repeatedly. [See, e.g., R. 176 & 401 f^a] 
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Salt Lake County in the tax seizure notice, Wasatch and JDJ thereby used force in 
detaining the Premises because the lock changes denied Aris free access to the Premises. 
For all the reasons stated above (pp. 12-13), the lock changes are irrelevant and certainly 
did not constitute the use of "force." 
2. Wrongful Eviction. 
Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ wrongfully evicted Aris from the Premises by 
two acts: (1) by supposedly excluding Enright from the Premises on January 22, 2002; 
and (2) by changing the locks without providing Aris a key. Wasatch and JDJ have 
already fully responded to these arguments in the forcible detainer discussion above, and 
will not repeat that discussion. For all the reasons discussed above - - including the fact 
that Aris had vacated and abandoned the Premises on January 4 and did not want to 
occupy the Premises, but at most only wanted to remove its Equipment - - the wrongful 
eviction judgment cannot stand. 
D. WASATCH AND JDJ DID NOT CONVERT THE EQUIPMENT. 
Aris does not challenge any of the evidence relied upon by Wasatch and JDJ for 
their argument they did not convert the Equipment, which once more consists of the 
testimony of Aris's own witnesses. Instead, Aris simply argues in conclusory fashion that 
Wasatch and JDJ have ignored the trial court's findings. That claim is incorrect. 
Wasatch and JDJ have marshaled the evidence and demonstrated based upon 
Aris's own evidence that when Enright attempted to take possession of the Equipment on 
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January 22, 2002 Aris had abandoned the Premises and JDJ therefore had the contractual 
right under Paragraph 20.1 of the Lease to retain and dispose of the Equipment and that 
JDJ also had a lessor's lien on the Equipment as of January 22. Further, Wasatch and JDJ 
had no obligation or right to allow Aris to take the Equipment then in possession of the 
doctors. Wasatch and JDJ also demonstrated based on Aris's own evidence that after 
January 22, with two irrelevant exceptions,9 Aris made no demand for possession of the 
Equipment, but only wanted access to the Premises for the purpose of inspecting and 
inventorying the Equipment and showing it to prospective purchasers, and that Wasatch 
gave Aris access to the Equipment each time a request was made. 
Aris argues in this regard that by January 22, Wasatch and JDJ knew that Aris 
wanted its Equipment, but from that date until July 2 when the Equipment was removed 
refused "repeated requests by Aris representatives for permission to remove Aris's 
property", quoting Finding No. 86. [Appellee's Brief at 38] Tellingly, Aris has not cited 
the court to any evidence to support the argument that Wasatch refused "repeated 
requests" to remove the Equipment after January 22. There is no such evidence. The true 
facts from the testimony of Aris's own witnesses are that Aris understood the Equipment 
had much more value in place than if removed and that the parties were cooperating for 
months to attempt to relet the Premises and sell the Equipment from the Premises before 
9
 The two exceptions are that Aris asked to remove a microkeratome from the Premises 
and was allowed to do so [R. 526 at 62] and that Aris was delayed from taking the Equipment 
sold to Barber from June 10 until June 25. However, this short delay did not cause any damage 
because the price Barber paid remained the same. [R. 527 at 175-177, 264 & 266-267] 
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Axis made demand in June 2002 to remove the Equipment and was permitted to do so. 
[See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at 11-15] 
Finally, Aris contends that Wasatch and JDJ did not assert waiver below, that they 
have failed to marshal the evidence with respect to waiver and that in any event Aris did 
not intend to waive any claims by leaving the Equipment on the Premises. All of these 
arguments are without merit. 
Wasatch and JDJ asserted waiver as an affirmative defense in their Answer. [R. 
108] Wasatch and JDJ argued at trial - - and the evidence demonstrated - - that Aris had 
left the Equipment on the Premises for months and the parties cooperated in attempting to 
relet the Premises and sell the Equipment and that Aris waived any right to claim 
damages. [See, e.g., R. 224-225, 232 & 288] The fact that (as Wasatch and JDJ recited in 
Appellants' Brief) the trial court found that Aris did not intend to waive its rights by 
leaving the Equipment on the Premises is irrelevant to the waiver argument. Waiver is 
based upon Aris's objective intent, not its secret subjective intent. [See cases cited in 
Appellants' Brief at 39] Aris objectively manifested its intent to waive any conversion 
claim by cooperating for months to relet the Premises and sell the Equipment from the 
Premises to maximize the amount that could be obtained from the sale of the Equipment 
in order to mitigate Aris's liability for damages for breach of the Lease, and by not 
making demand for possession. 
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E. THE DAMAGES AWARD SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
1. Aris Suffered No Damages Because of the Fact the Equipment Remained 
on the Premises. 
Aris is unable in its brief to point the Court to one piece of evidence demonstrating 
that Aris could not have sold the Equipment while it was on the Premises or that the fact 
that the Equipment was on the Premises interfered in any way with any sales effort. 
Instead, Aris is satisfied to baldly conclude that Wasatch and JDJ "have no basis for 
suggesting that Aris could have sold the Equipment while in Wasatch's custody." 
[Appellee's Brief at 41] This argument ignores the fact that Aris did in fact sell some of 
the Equipment while it was on the Premises and the further fact that Aris reached an 
agreement with VISX while the Equipment was on the Premises to take back two of the 
lasers. In addition, the argument ignores that it was Aris's burden to demonstrate it 
suffered damages because the Equipment remained on the Premises. Aris failed to 
shoulder this burden. Aris could have sold the Equipment from the Premises just as 
easily as it was later sold from storage.10 
10
 Wasatch and JDJ raised this argument below by arguing that Aris could not prove any 
loss for the period of time the property remained on the Premises and that Aris was not entitled to 
any damages during the period in which it was cooperating with Wasatch to keep the Equipment 
in place to lure a new tenant [R. 233]; by arguing that Aris was given access to the Premises to 
inspect and inventory the Equipment and show the Premises and the Equipment to third parties 
any time it requested [R. 172-173]; and by arguing that Soto's testimony that she had potential 
buyers for the Equipment was insufficient to prove damages from the fact the Equipment 
remained on the Premises because she was unable to name any potential buyers to whom sales 
had fallen through based on delay or the loss that Aris had supposedly suffered as a result of any 
delay. [R. 293] 
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2. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Deprove Depreciation of the Lasers. 
Aris trots out once again its familiar refrain that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of depreciation without telling 
the court what evidence it is that Wasatch and JDJ have supposedly failed to marshal. In 
fact, with one minor irrelevant exception, all of the evidence cited by Aris in its argument 
was in fact marshaled.11 
Aris has not and cannot explain how it was damaged by depreciation in view of the 
fact that the S-3 laser was simply a software upgrade that could be installed on each S-2 
laser and that the cost of doing so did not increase during the time the lasers were on the 
Premises, or how Aris was damaged in view of the fact that the new technology hit the 
market months before Aris vacated the Premises. That lack of proof is fatal to the 
depreciation claim. 
3. Holdren's Methodology Was Defective. 
After erroneously arguing that Wasatch's and JDJ's methodology argument fails 
because of a failure to marshal evidence (again not telling the Court what evidence they 
supposedly failed to marshal), Aris attempts to support the damage award by arguing that 
11
 The one exception is that Aris mistakenly argues that Soto testified the depreciation in 
the value of the lasers by virtue of the new S-3 software did not occur in 2001 because the 
upgrade software was on back order at the time. [Appellee's Brief at 42] However, Soto did not 
testify that the fact that the S-3 laser was on back order had any impact at all on when the 
depreciation occurred. Soto only testified that the S-3 laser hit the market in the third or fourth 
quarter of 2001 and the S-2 started to lose its value. [R. 527 at 243-244] 
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Holdren's market data approach was sufficient to support the judgment. [Appellee's Brief 
at 43] This argument does not accurately reflect Holdren's testimony. 
Holdren testified he used two alternative valuation approaches, an accelerated 
depreciation approach and a market data approach. Contrary to Aris's argument, he then 
took the average of these two approaches in calculating depreciation. He used the same 
flawed methodology of averaging the estimated remaining useful life of all of the 
Equipment for both valuation approaches. [R. 526 at 118-122] 
Aris also argues that Wasatch and JDJ did not raise an evidentiary objection at 
trial. This is not an objection to the admissibility of evidence. Holdren was qualified as 
an expert and was free to testify concerning his opinion based upon the methodology he 
used.12 However, because his methodology was flawed (which Aris does not contest), the 
award of damages cannot stand. 
4. Aris Failed to Prove the Amount for Which it Sold the Equipment. 
Aris impliedly concedes that it failed to prove the actual price for which it sold 
many items of its Equipment. However, Aris is incorrect in arguing that this argument 
was not raised at trial. [See, e.g., R 576, 233, 308 & 351] 
12
 City ofHildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, 28 P.3d 697 (Utah 2001), cited by Aris in 
support of its argument, is inapposite. In Cooke, the plaintiff argued that the defendant 
landowners were not competent to testify as to the highest and best use of the real property. The 
Supreme Court held that the argument that expert testimony was required on this issue had been 
properly preserved below. Wasatch and JDJ do not argue that Holdren was incompetent to 
testify as an expert. 
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Aris also argues that the Court found that Aris could have obtained only $55,000 
to $60,000 for the lasers in July 2002. The fact that there was evidence on what Aris 
could have obtained for some of the Equipment (this evidence was marshaled in 
Appellants' Brief) does not get around the fact that Aris failed to prove the sales price of 
all the Equipment. Thus, the damage award cannot stand.13 
5. Wasatch and JDJ Are Not Liable for the Missing or Damaged Equipment. 
Aris argues that regardless of who took the missing Equipment or who damaged 
the damaged Equipment, Wasatch and JDJ are liable for the value of that Equipment 
because they did not allow Aris to take it on January 22. [Appellee's Brief at 44-45] The 
testimony of Aris's own witnesses disposes of this argument. 
Aris's witnesses testified that when Aris vacated the Premises On January 4, 2002, 
Aris specifically agreed that the doctors could continue using the Equipment while Aris 
attempted to negotiate for the doctors to assume the Lease and purchase the Equipment 
and that those negotiations continued until February 15, 2002. [R. 527 at 235-237; R. 527 
at 219-220; R. 526 at 153-155] Wasatch and JDJ cannot be held liable for Equipment that 
may very well have been taken or damaged by the doctors or the fired employees while 
the Equipment was in the doctors' possession with Aris's consent. In fact, Olsen wrote 
the doctors' lawyer on April 18, 2002 concerning Aris's recent inventory of "the 
13
 Aris further argues that the award of damages was based on depreciation, not sales 
price. However, obviously, Aris could recover no more than the difference between the value of 
the Equipment as of January 22 and the amount for which Aris actually sold the Equipment. 
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equipment stored" at the Premises, inquiring if the doctors still had possession of the 
missing equipment or if it was in their possession. [Pi's Ex. 23]14 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of JDJ on its 
Counterclaim for damages, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys fees incurred below and 
on appeal. 
>•& DATED this fc day of December, 2004. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
STEPHENS. MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Appellants 
14
 Aris is correct that the trial court did not award lost opportunity damages. Wasatch 
and JDJ acknowledge their mistake in including a lost opportunity damage argument in their 
brief, and hereby withdraw that argument. 
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